4797366 2000-02-14  20:55  /106 rader/ Postmaster
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <9763>
Ärende: sshd and pop/ftponly users incorrect configuration
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Approved-By: aleph1@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
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Message-ID:  <Pine.LNX.4.10.10002111717370.27486-100000@vulcan.alphanet.ch>
Date:         Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:18:31 +0100
Reply-To: Marc SCHAEFER <schaefer@ALPHANET.CH>
Sender: Bugtraq List <BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM>
From: Marc SCHAEFER <schaefer@ALPHANET.CH>
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To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM

NAME
   sshd-restricted-users-incorrect-configuration

AUTHOR
   Marc SCHAEFER <schaefer@alphanet.ch>
   Andreas Trottmann <andreas.trottmann@werft22.com>

THANKS
   OpenBSD security team

VERSION
   $Id: sshd-restricted-users-incorrect-configuration,v 1.2 2000/01/25 10:27:56 schaefer Exp $

ABSTRACT
   In some cases where a system must be configured so that specific
   users only have access to POP or FTP (or a specific restricted shell,
   e.g. a BBS or lynx menu), the addition of the SSH protocol server
   (sshd) may create a security hole. The user, if they try to access
   the server per telnet succeed, but they are immediately thrown
   out (because their shell is /bin/false, e.g.), or a special restricted
   shell runs (e.g. they can change their passwd, etc). In that case,
   using sshd may create a subtle security hole allowing those users to,
   like normal users, use the SSH protocol to issue TCP connections coming
   from the attacked host.

IMPACT
   Any remote user with an account on the machine, even without real shell
   access, may open a TCP connection which will:

      - appear to be open from root@localhost (in the IDENT identd
        protocol)

      - be able to connect to any services which are not firewalled on
        the loopback (even if they are firewalled or tcp_wrapper tcpd
        protected from the outside).

      - be able to connect to any remote machine from the attacked host,
        the connection appearing to come from the attacked host with
        a wrong IDENT (see above).

IMMUNE CONFIGURATIONS
   You are immune to this problem if one (or more) of the following
   is true:

      - the group(s) where those users belong to is listed in
        /etc/ssh/sshd_config or equivalent configuration file as
           DenyGroups group1 group2  # etc
        (this is the recommended setup)

      - no user which has an account hasn't a shell (he will be able
        to do the above, except the root@ IDENT, anyway, if he has a shell)

      - your POP or FTP users do not authentify against the system
        password database (/etc/{passwd|shadow}), but against a
        private database and the user is locked in the system password
        database (passwd -l).

      - you only allow RSA authentification, and the users cannot modify
        their ~/.ssh from e.g. FTP.

      - you do not run sshd. Have TcpAllowForwarding to no in the
        configuration file doesn't seem to work, since
        it only denies -R style forwarding.

OPERATING SYSTEMS
   UNIX

FIX
   - There is no fix for the root@ IDENT bug for legitimate user.
     This is presumably a bug in ssh-1.2.27 and OpenSSH 1.2.1 and
     earlier releases: sshd should not do the forwarding as root but
     as the user. Note that it has not been investigated if this could
     create other problems. This bug is a long-standing known bug,
     and also is due to the fact IDENT information was never supposed
     to be trusted anyway.
   - Put all ftponly and poponly users in specially identified groups with
        DenyGroups ftponly poponly
     This will fix the open-port-from-no-shell-user
   - Or lock the user in the system password database and use a special
     database for FTP and POP.

EXPLOIT
   Please do not request exploit from the listed authors. Requests for
   exploits will be ignored. A working exploit exists and has been
   tested on current Linux distributions. It is possible that an
   exploit be posted some time in the future (or that someone reads
   this and does it by himself ...).

NOTES
   This advisory is for information only. No warranty either expressed
   or implied. Full disclosure and dissemination are allowed as long as
   this advisory is published in full. No responsability will be taken
   from abuse or lack of use of the information in this advisory.
(4797366) ------------------------------------------

4801659 2000-02-15  20:27  /42 rader/ Postmaster
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <9777>
Ärende: Re: sshd and pop/ftponly users incorrect configuration
------------------------------------------------------------
Approved-By: aleph1@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
Delivered-To: bugtraq@lists.securityfocus.com
Delivered-To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
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Message-ID:  <Pine.LNX.3.95.1000214142352.22941A-100000@animal.blarg.net>
Date:         Mon, 14 Feb 2000 14:26:51 -0800
Reply-To: CDI <cdi@THEWEBMASTERS.NET>
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In-Reply-To:  <Pine.LNX.4.10.10002111717370.27486-100000@vulcan.alphanet.ch>

On Fri, 11 Feb 2000, Marc SCHAEFER wrote:

> NAME
>    sshd-restricted-users-incorrect-configuration
>

[snip]

> IMMUNE CONFIGURATIONS
>    You are immune to this problem if one (or more) of the following
>    is true:
>
>       - the group(s) where those users belong to is listed in
>         /etc/ssh/sshd_config or equivalent configuration file as
>            DenyGroups group1 group2  # etc
>         (this is the recommended setup)

Just a quick note - it's much more accurate (not to mention secure)
to use 'AllowGroups' rather than DenyGroups. If AllowGroups is set,
then only if a users primary group matches one of the specified group
names are they permitted to complete a connection attempt.

____________________________________ The Web Master's Net
http://www.thewebmasters.net/ Today's Excuse: Someone is standing on
the ethernet cable, causeing a kink in the cable
(4801659) ------------------------------------------(Ombruten)

4802132 2000-02-15  22:33  /40 rader/ Postmaster
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <9788>
Ärende: Re: sshd and pop/ftponly users incorrect configuration
------------------------------------------------------------
Approved-By: aleph1@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
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Delivered-To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
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Message-ID:  <Pine.LNX.4.10.10002151539030.23676-100000@vulcan.alphanet.ch>
Date:         Tue, 15 Feb 2000 15:44:08 +0100
Reply-To: Marc SCHAEFER <schaefer@ALPHANET.CH>
Sender: Bugtraq List <BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM>
From: Marc SCHAEFER <schaefer@ALPHANET.CH>
X-To:         Nick Lamb <njl98r@ecs.soton.ac.uk>
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To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
In-Reply-To:  <20000215004333.A16931@ecs.soton.ac.uk>

On Tue, 15 Feb 2000, Nick Lamb wrote:

> 1. Is this a bug (which will be or has already been fixed in OpenSSH)

it's a bug, a feature, and a misconfiguration. The bug is SSH issuing
local redirecting connections with root. This was presumably fixed in
OpenSSH. The feature allowing to open connections coming from
localhost for valid (with a shell) users is a feature, and the
misconfiguration is forgetting DenyGroups on users supposing not to
be able to log in except e.g. for mail.

The real issue is however the common misconception that setting
/bin/false to a user shell to prevent it to login while still
allowing reading POP mail and FTP is enough to prevent the user from
issuing local-issued connections to services. The impact is clear:
bypassing firewalling, or hosts.deny. Additionnally it will create
fake IDENT (but that's a ssh feature, it seems).

> 2. Does PAM provide any immunity? If the user should be locked out
> of SSH by PAM (as in the Linux OpenSSH ports) then will this

If the user is refused by ssh authentification (be it because it's
firewalled, DenyGroupsed, invalid password or PAM), you are safe.

Noone we talk about breaking passworded accounts.
(4802132) ------------------------------------------(Ombruten)

4802516 2000-02-16  00:11  /19 rader/ Postmaster
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <9795>
Ärende: Re: sshd and pop/ftponly users incorrect configuration
------------------------------------------------------------
Approved-By: aleph1@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
Delivered-To: bugtraq@lists.securityfocus.com
Delivered-To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
Message-ID:  <200002151337.GAA07952@cvs.openbsd.org>
Date:         Tue, 15 Feb 2000 06:37:23 -0700
Reply-To: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@CVS.OPENBSD.ORG>
Sender: Bugtraq List <BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM>
From: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@CVS.OPENBSD.ORG>
X-To:         Marc SCHAEFER <schaefer@ALPHANET.CH>
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To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
In-Reply-To:  Your message of "Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:18:31 +0100." 
             <Pine.LNX.4.10.10002111717370.27486-100000@vulcan.alphanet.ch>

This is not an ssh security issue.

This is because you are trusting the ident/auth protocol.

Don't do that.
(4802516) ------------------------------------------