97284 2003-04-01 02:59 /74 rader/ Daniel Ahlberg <aliz@gentoo.org>
Importerad: 2003-04-01 02:59 av Brevbäraren
Extern mottagare: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <4274>
Ärende: GLSA: krb5 & mit-krb5 (200303-28)
------------------------------------------------------------
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------
GENTOO LINUX SECURITY ANNOUNCEMENT 200303-28
- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------
PACKAGE : krb5 & mit-krb5
SUMMARY : multiple vulnerabilities fixed
DATE : 2003-03-31 10:01 UTC
EXPLOIT : remote
VERSIONS AFFECTED : krb5: <1.2.7-r2 mit-krb5: <1.2.7
FIXED VERSION : krb5: >=1.2.7-r2 mit-krb5: >=1.2.7
CVE : CAN-2003-0139 CAN-2003-0138 CAN-2003-0082
CAN-2003-0072 CAN-2003-0028
- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- From advisory:
"An attacker who has successfully authenticated to the Kerberos
administration daemon (kadmind) may be able to crash kadmind or induce
it to leak sensitive information, such as secret keys. For the attack
to succeed, it is believed that the configuration of the kadmind
installation must allow it to successfully allocate more than INT_MAX
bytes of memory."
Read the full advisory at
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2003-003-xdr.txt
- From advisory:
"A cryptographic weakness in version 4 of the Kerberos protocol allows
an attacker to use a chosen-plaintext attack to impersonate any
principal in a realm. Additional cryptographic weaknesses in the krb4
implementation included in the MIT krb5 distribution permit the use of
cut-and-paste attacks to fabricate krb4 tickets for unauthorized
client principals if triple-DES keys are used to key krb4 services.
These attacks can subvert a site's entire Kerberos authentication
infrastructure."
Read the full advisory at
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2003-004-krb4.txt
- From advisory:
"Buffer overrun and underrun problems exist in Kerberos principal name
handling in unusual cases, such as names with zero components, names
with one empty component, or host-based service principal names with
no host name component."
Read the full advisory at
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2003-005-buf.txt
SOLUTION
It is recommended that all Gentoo Linux users who are running
app-crypt/krb5 and/or app-crypt/mit-krb5 upgrade to krb5-1.2.7-r2
and/or mit-krb5-1.2.7 as follows:
emerge sync
emerge krb5
and/or
emerge mit-krb5
emerge clean
- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------
aliz@gentoo.org - GnuPG key is available at http://cvs.gentoo.org/~aliz
- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQE+iBH9fT7nyhUpoZMRApoJAJ4riLzN44nYgta6XcEWPUweqCTG8QCeMMCs
E+Cyl6Q3Z84+9kZWdJlLAfU=
=+CmS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
(97284) /Daniel Ahlberg <aliz@gentoo.org>/(Ombruten)